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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose – To examine whether accredited police agencies display higher clearance rates than 
their non-accredited counterparts. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The study group consists of all municipal police departments 
operating continuously in the State of Florida from 1997 through 2006.  Independent variables 
capture organizational characteristics for nearly 260 agencies to determine whether becoming 
accredited improves clearance rates. 
 
Findings – Random-effects tobit analysis suggests that accreditation status does not affect 
violent and property crime clearance rates.  Clearance rates are more influenced by the number 
of sworn personnel and law enforcement expenditures per capita. 
 
Research limitations/implications – Much of what is currently known about the impact of 
accreditation stems from anecdotal and testimonial evidence.  Still, the industry manages to 
expand and flourish.  A glaring need for sound empirical research is evident. 
 
Practical implication – Instead of advancing the protection of local communities and bringing 
about meaningful organizational reform, accreditation appears to be a useful tool for bureaucrats 
who wish to further their own careers. 
 
Originality/value – Advocates link accreditation status to a number of benefits, including better 
investigatory practices that culminate in more solved cases.  Recent academic work suggests that 
accreditation has dubious benefits, despite claims to the contrary.  This study adds to that 
literature by showing that accreditation also fails to elevate clearance rates. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Being accredited is a coveted status in many fields.  It means that an institution or 
organization has satisfactorily demonstrated to an external oversight body that it meets or 
exceeds a host of state-of-the-art standards (Southerland, Merlo, Robinson, Benekos, & 
Albanese, 2007; Thrasher, 1979).  Compliance with these “best practices” criteria is associated 
with greater operational efficiency, outstanding service delivery, and exemplary achievement.  A 
variety of fields (e.g., colleges and universities, hospital administration, law, engineering, 
counseling and therapy, and accounting) have embraced national and regional accreditation as a 
mechanism for avoiding mediocrity and promoting excellence.  As of late, law enforcement has 
made overtures to join this movement. 
 The impetus for upgrading law enforcement agencies began in 1979 when four prominent 
national groups (International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Organization of Black 
Law Enforcement Executives, National Sheriffs’ Association, and Police Executive Research 
Forum) banded together to promote greater police professionalism.  These efforts eventually led 
to the establishment of the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 
(CALEA), which certified its first agency in 1984.  Despite an initial wave of interest, 
enthusiasm soon subsided.  While recent figures indicate that over 950 agencies are actively 
involved in the accreditation process (CALEA, 2009a), the fact remains that 25 years later 
CALEA has granted its seal of approval to no more than 3 percent of all law enforcement 
agencies in the United States (Hougland & Mesloh, 2005).  This attainment stands in direct 
contrast to an optimistic projection that CALEA had the potential to accredit just about every 
agency in this country within two decades of its inception (Mastrofski, 1986). 
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 Much of the reluctance, especially for smaller agencies, to seek CALEA confirmation 
stems from the time commitment and costs associated with the entire review process (Carter & 
Sapp, 1994; DuPont, 1993; Kurz & Kelly, 2005).  At least seventeen states have tried to 
counteract this tendency by establishing their own local, and less expensive, versions of 
accreditation standards.  Florida, the location of the present study, is one of those states. 
Hardly any systematic information exists about the impact of police accreditation despite 
the multi-million dollar operation that CALEA oversees1 and the industry of advisors this 
enterprise has spawned.2  The CALEA website, as well as those of parallel state organizations, 
relies heavily upon testimonials and anecdotal stories that extol the virtues of accreditation.  On 
the academic side, the limited amount of research that does exist is rife with interpretational 
difficulties, shrouded with a variety of methodological shortcomings, and replete with simplistic 
analyses.  For example, the Burlingame and Baro (2005) claim that accreditation standards 
produce greater personnel diversification remains unconvincing in the absence of any control for 
whether the agencies had fallen under a consent decree in the past.  Similarly, reliance upon a 
series of difference-of-means tests to isolate disparities between accredited and non-accredited 
agencies (e.g., Hougland & Mesloh, 2005; McCabe & Fajardo, 2001) begs the question of 
whether the introduction of any control variables would alter the interpretations.  As Doerner and 
Doerner (2009, p. 795) opine, the time is ripe to investigate the benefits of accreditation more 
stringently. 
The current study attempts to respond to this challenge by focusing on the achievement of 
accreditation status and one form of organizational productivity.  A major goal of accreditation is 
to introduce reforms that refine organizational oversight, implement state-of-the-art practices, 
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and enhance the delivery of more efficient and effective services.  The expectation developed in 
this paper is that such efforts should become reflected in organizational outputs like improved 
clearance rates. 
THE ACCREDITATION MOVEMENT 
 When CALEA arrived on the scene, a number of initiatives already were underway to 
improve personnel quality by instituting more stringent entrance requirements, providing better 
pre-service training for recruits, and recognizing the need for continuous in-service training for 
veteran officers.  Scant energy was aimed at organizational reform to complement this 
individual-level focus.  In this respect, CALEA was poised to fill an important niche. 
 The first task that awaited CALEA was to identify aspects critical to discharging a law 
enforcement agency’s mission.  Six target areas were isolated (Cotter, 1983, pp. 20-21).  They 
included the philosophy behind the law enforcement function, management and administrative 
practices, personnel policies, employee deployment and assignments, prisoner control and court-
related activities, as well as support functions and technical services.  The CALEA staff then 
developed a series of applicable standards that reflected critical concerns and would help mold or 
improve organizational practices within each area. 
 Once an agency decides to seek accreditation, it embarks on a self-study process. This 
one- to two-year period entails reviewing all policies, procedures, and activities to determine 
whether the agency satisfies CALEA standards or needs to take corrective actions that will bring 
it into accordance with these expectations.  Compiling documents and supporting evidence that 
demonstrate alignment with industry standards allows external assessors the opportunity to 
conduct an independent evaluation of what the agency is doing.  After the outside review is 
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completed, CALEA decides whether to issue its stamp of approval to the agency.  The initial 
accreditation is valid for five years.  After that period expires, an agency must demonstrate 
continued compliance with the original standards and demonstrate how its organizational 
practices satisfy any new or revised directives. 
 As mentioned earlier, the time commitment and expenditures associated with seeking 
national accreditation have proven to be daunting obstacles for some agencies, particularly 
smaller ones (Carter & Sapp, 1994; DuPont, 1993; Kurz & Kelly, 2005; Mastrofski, 1986, p. 57).  
These outlays, coupled with dwindling resources, have forced administrators in many agencies to 
forgo the national credential.  In response to this dilemma, at least 17 states have established 
their own pared-down, less expensive versions of accreditation.  Florida is one of those states. 
 In 1993, the state legislature turned to the Florida Sheriffs’ Association and the Florida 
Police Chiefs’ Association for guidance.  The Commission for Florida Law Enforcement 
Accreditation (CFA) was formed under the auspices of these two associations and modeled after 
CALEA.  Like the national process, agencies seeking CFA status must engage in a self-study, 
satisfy a variety of Florida-specific standards, host an on-site visit from trained assessors, and 
pass external muster.  By the end of 2009, 91 out of the 266 Florida municipal police 
departments in continuous operation since 1996 had gained the CFA imprimatur. 
THE BENEFITS OF ACCREDITATION 
 CALEA, CFA, and many other state oversight bodies maintain public internet pages that 
discuss various aspects of accreditation.  These web locations typically have a section that 
features the benefits administrators, community members, and employees can expect to derive 
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from successful completion of this voluntary self-study process.  As Table 1 shows, several 
common refrains surface when it comes to heralding the virtues of accreditation. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 Probably the most obvious benefit of accreditation is that it requires agencies to commit 
operational practices to a series of concrete, written directives.3  The ostensible purpose behind 
this endeavor is to ward off unarticulated improvisation, whereby low-ranking patrol officers 
make uninformed decisions without appropriate administrative guidance.  The more pressing 
reasons for institutionalizing policy guidelines is to structure decision making and to forestall a 
judicial finding of deliberate indifference in the event of civil litigation.  In other words, the lack 
of a formal policy does not insulate an agency from being held accountable for the actions of its 
members.  Remaining silent on key issues will only expose the organization to even greater civil 
liability and a correspondingly larger settlement.  An allied derivative of accreditation and 
periodic re-accreditation is that agencies remain abreast of contemporary developments and 
embrace industry standards. 
 Although accreditation guidelines address what topics should receive consideration in the 
written directives, it is important to recognize they do not dictate the exact procedures these 
statements should embody.  For example, a standard might articulate the need to distinguish full-
time from part-time personnel, but it would not impose a specific number of hours governing this 
classification.  Along the same lines, accrediting bodies do not prohibit, nor do they endorse, 
reliance upon warning shots in a use-of-force policy.  However, the assumption is that 
administrators will visit this topic and the subsequent written directive they develop will relay 
the ensuing expectations to the membership and the public. 
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 In addition to setting operational procedures, the web sites post several common themes. 
There is the expectation that a more transparent law enforcement agency will exude greater 
public confidence, promote community policing, and increase cooperation with local leaders and 
other governmental units.  Finally, employee morale should rise in response to the routinization 
of personnel decisions, fair and equitable practices, and overall professional treatment. 
 The picture that Table 1 yields is that the benefits emanating from participation in the 
accreditation process are consistent and similar from one state to the next.  In some instances, 
these expositions utilize very similar, if not the exact same, language.  Hence, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that accredited agencies would reap some common outcomes.  It is 
suggested that elevated clearance rates should be one gain derived from accreditation. 
THE CLEARANCE LITERATURE 
 There are two ways in which to clear a criminal case according to guidelines the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) distributes to all participating law enforcement 
agencies on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The most common avenue is to 
arrest a suspect for the incident and then forward the case to the state attorney’s office for 
prosecution (FDLE, 2008a, p. 27).  The second route occurs when the investigating agency has 
developed sufficient probable cause to identify a suspect, but unusual circumstances stymie 
efforts to take that suspect into actual physical custody.  Examples of typical interferences would 
be when the suspect has died, when extradition from another jurisdiction is blocked, if the victim 
or a central witness elects not to cooperate, whenever a juvenile case receives non-judicial 
handling, or when the state attorney declines to pursue the matter (FDLE, 2008a, pp. 28-29). 
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 Previous studies have recognized the utility of examining clearance activity.  For one 
thing, case clearances provide a standardized inter-agency assessment tool (Borg & Parker, 2001, 
pp. 445-446; Jang, Hoover, & Lawton, 2008, p. 532; Paré, Felson, & Ouimet, 2007, p. 243).  
They also reflect police resource allocation, performance, and efficiency (Addington, 2006; 
Davies, 2007; Litwin, 2004, p. 331; Litwin & Xu, 2007, p. 94).  Thus, clearance rates are an 
appealing comparative outcome measure. 
 Researchers who analyze police clearance practices are aware of two empirical 
regularities.  First, U.S. homicide clearance rates have plummeted over the past 50 years, 
dropping from 94 percent in 1960 to the current level of 62 percent (Ousey & Lee, 2010; 
Regoeczi, Jarvis, & Riedel, 2008, pp. 142-143; Riedel & Boulahanis, 2007, pp. 151-152).  The 
exact reasons behind this decline are still under investigation.  Second, considerable variation in 
clearance rates exists from agency to agency, from offense to offense, and from case to case.  
These observations have spawned two distinct streams of inquiry.  The first approach 
concentrates on unearthing case characteristics likely to produce an arrest or identify the actual 
perpetrator.  The second path entails a comparative organizational analysis to determine why 
some agencies are more successful than others in solving cases.  These studies routinely examine 
criminal lethality because of the wealth of information contained in homicide documentation. 
 Analyzing case characteristics has proven to be a fruitful venture, enabling researchers to 
gain insight into how homicide cases are solved (Addington, 2006; Alderden & Lavery, 2007; 
Lee, 2005; Litwin, 2004; Litwin & Xu, 2007; Puckett & Lundman, 2003; Regoeczi et al., 2008; 
Roberts & Lyons, 2009; Taylor, Holleran, & Topalli, 2009).  However, three aspects preclude 
this vein of studies from being relevant to the current project.  First, these articles dissect only 
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homicide incidents and the present study considers homicide plus six other index offenses.  It 
may be that the findings to date are homicide-specific and do not pertain to other crimes.  
Second, while the documentation surrounding homicide investigations is rich, other offenses do 
not receive similar attention.  Third, the current study involves a multi-city comparison and 
routine record-keeping is far from systematic.  Except for homicide, no secondary sources 
capture itemized case information from one locale to the next on a regular basis. 
 The second framework, organizational characteristics, is more pertinent to the present 
study.  Wellford and Cronin (1999) analyzed 798 homicide cases and concluded that sound 
police investigative practices and ample resource allocation (e.g., crime scene preservation, 
immediately canvassing the scene for witnesses, detailed follow-up procedures to check leads, 
and deployment of detectives) were crucial determinants of whether a case would be solved.  
Other researchers have seized upon this orientation with varying degrees of success.  Puckett and 
Lundman (2003), for example, found that while detective experience and workload were not 
related to case outcome, citizen cooperation was a key variable.  A much more intensive analysis 
of agency practices in 55 jurisdictions pinpointed the importance of in-service training for 
detectives, greater reliance upon more scientific analysis of evidence, appropriate administrative 
case management, and public cooperation as important ingredients of homicide clearances (Keel, 
Jarvis, & Muirhead, 2009).  Meanwhile, Roberts (2008) was unable to connect educational 
requirements for new officers, the ratio of investigators to violent crime, and involvement in 
community-policing initiatives with clearance rates for robbery, rape, or aggravated assault. 
LINKING ACCREDITATION AND CLEARANCE RATES 
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 The CALEA web site houses statements from police administrators that explain how 
accreditation has boosted agency performance or service delivery.  While one might view these 
declarations as highly selective, self-serving, or merely testimonial in nature, these remarks do 
provide valuable glimpses into the occupational mind-set of police administrators who have 
ventured into the accreditation process.  A number of these comments target clearance rates, 
arrests, and other crime control practices.  For instance, the Kingsport (TN) police chief points to 
accreditation as being responsible for improving the Part I clearance rates in his jurisdiction from 
10% in 1987 to 56% in 1998 (Keesling, 1999).  In other instances, compliance with CALEA 
standards is credited with the solving of a “cold case” (Shearer, n.d.), the seizure of a dangerous 
police assassin without further incident (Johnson, n.d.), and clearances via the arrests of two 
suspects responsible for a string of armed robberies (Seebacher, n.d.). 
 The Florida accreditation manual devotes a chapter to how agency members, both patrol 
and plain-clothes, should conduct criminal investigations.  While some of these standards 
address administrative aspects, others are more operationally oriented.  The goal is to have “more 
efficient and effective criminal investigations” (CFA, 2008, Chapter 18).  The standards include 
a wide array of topics and involve such things as setting up and maintaining case files, use of 
informants, crime scene preservation, evidence collection, interview and interrogation protocols, 
follow-up procedures, preparation and execution of search warrants, reliance upon polygraph and 
voice stress analyses, and surveillance practices.  In short, this litany of “best practices,” when 
taken as a whole, is designed to help agencies conclude investigations successfully. 
 The message these expositions deliver is two-fold.  First, implementation of accreditation 
standards places agencies in a more strategic position to solve cases expeditiously and enhances 
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their crime-control performance.  Second, these achievements can be demonstrated through 
standard, objective accounting methods.  Interestingly, the existing literature does not contain 
any independent, third-party multivariate empirical assessments that test these claims.  As a 
result, the present study aims to remedy that gap by analyzing city clearance rates to determine 
whether accredited agencies out-perform their non-accredited counterparts in Florida. 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
THE STUDY GROUP 
 While the selection of Florida as the study site for the current project was largely 
fortuitous due to the researchers’ ability to locate and assemble data from existing archives, the 
choice makes sense for at least three other reasons.  First, the state is home to 2.2 percent of 
municipal police agencies, 4.9 percent of sworn city police officers, and 5.3 percent of full-time 
local police employees in the United States (Reaves, 2007, p. 10).  Second, both the Florida 
Sheriffs’ Association and the Florida Police Chiefs’ Association played pivotal roles in 
establishing the body tasked with instituting a voluntary accreditation plan.  This hands-on 
involvement was intended to overcome some of the reluctance that CALEA encountered, but 
could not navigate.  While only 10 percent of Florida police organizations had won CALEA 
endorsement by the end of 2006 (Doerner & Doerner, 2009), 31 percent had gained CFA 
recognition.  Finally, state-level accreditation was framed as a more feasible alternative for 
smaller and mid-sized agencies.  In addition to containing four of the largest 50 municipal 
agencies in the nation, Florida also has a modest concentration of smaller departments.  
According to the 2007 Criminal Justice Agencies Profile (CJAP), 21 percent of all municipal 
agencies in the “Sunshine State” employed fewer than ten full-time sworn officers, 28 percent 
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fell into the 10–24 member range, and another 21 percent occupied the 25–49 grouping (FDLE, 
2008b).  Given these considerations, Florida poses an opportune venue for the present study. 
 Another consideration that has surfaced in the clearance literature is the necessity of 
examining data longitudinally.  One way to sidestep the issues that accompany limited sample 
sizes and annual fluctuations is to average clearance rates over a multi-year period (Borg & 
Parker, 2001; Ousey & Lee, 2010) or pool cases over an extended number of years into a single 
file (Alderden & Lavery, 2007; Allison, Schuck, & Lersch, 2005; Jarvis & Regoeczi, 2009; Keel 
et al., 2009; Lee, 2005; Litwin, 2004; Ousey & Lee, 2010; Puckett & Lundman, 2003; Regoeczi 
et al., 2008; Riedel & Boulahanis, 2007; Roberts & Lyons, 2009).  Another strategy is to 
partition the data into distinct time periods and analyze them separately (Litwin & Xu, 2007).  
While all these approaches have curative powers and can be appropriate alternatives, they 
underscore the need to be more sensitive to the issue of change over time.  Given these 
considerations, the analytical technique taken in the present study is to conduct a panel data 
analysis to isolate what impact, if any, that accreditation exerts upon clearance rates.  
Mathematically, the model can be written as 
itititit uXaccredclear   10  
where the subscript refers to police agency i in year t and the error term u is distributed N(0,σ2). 
 The study group is restricted to Florida municipal police departments that were in 
continuous operation throughout the 1997–2006 period and that also participated in both the 
CJAP and UCR programs.  A handful of departments, containing the equivalent of mostly one or 
two full-time sworn officers, were chronic non-participants in the CJAP survey and were 
eliminated from inclusion in the sample. In addition, agencies that came into existence or were 
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disbanded during this time frame were not included in the analysis.  Under ideal conditions, the 
final study group would have the potential to amass a total of 2,570 data points for each variable 
utilized in the analysis (257 agencies over a ten-year period).  However, nine agencies either 
came into existence, were disbanded, or had missing data (discussed later) during this time 
frame.  Thus, the panel is slightly unbalanced. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 Starting in 1996, FDLE launched a series titled Criminal Justice Agency Profile, an 
annual survey of all local, city, county, and state law enforcement organizations.  This data 
collection effort is patterned after the national Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) project sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice.  Unlike 
LEMAS, CJAP contacts all agencies with fewer than 100 sworn members and is conducted on an 
annual, not periodic, basis.  Information is gathered regarding minimum entrance requirements 
for incoming personnel, pre-service and in-service training requirements, employee salaries and 
benefits, various organizational aspects, and personnel characteristics.  The current study relies 
upon this CJAP inventory to determine whether accreditation improves police resources 
sufficiently enough to exert a discernible effect on clearance rates. 
 The first group of variables extracted from CJAP was intended to tap patrol investigative 
readiness.  Some studies have indicated that a prompt and thorough initial response can foster the 
resolution of homicide cases (Keel et al., 2009; Puckett & Lundman, 2003; Wellford & Cronin, 
1999).  Both CALEA and CFA maintain that accredited organizations house a more responsive, 
better-equipped, more educated, and diverse corps of officers.  As a result, the items included in 
the present study are whether the agency had established a canine unit,4 the minimum education 
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level required for entry-level personnel, the minimum education level required for promotion to 
sergeant, how many weeks of preparation recruits receive during the post-academy Field 
Training Officer Program,5 and agency size in terms of the number of sworn personnel.  The 
thinking is that a methodical and knowledgeable patrol response should result in more case 
closures.  
 The CJAP instrument asks agency administrators to indicate whether their department 
engages in any community-oriented policing (COP) practices.  The basic premise behind the  
COP philosophy, an orientation that accreditation standards readily embrace (Cordner & 
Williams, 1995; Gingerich & Russell, 2006), is that the police cannot solve the crime problem 
unilaterally.  Instead, law enforcement officials and the community must come together to form a 
joint partnership.  Under this perspective, engaging in discourse on a routine basis, winning 
public trust, achieving mutual respect, and addressing quality-of-life issues are essential to 
effective crime control.  While further probes into the quantity, quality, and types of COP would 
be more sensitive, the CJAP is restricted to just a single global question.   
To control for fiscal capacity, law enforcement expenditure per capita was included.  This 
variable divides the total annual police department budget by the number of inhabitants residing 
with the city limits.  Previous studies of police organizations have invoked this cost-of-service 
indicator as a way to reflect the resources available for the police mission and the level of 
protection city residents receive (Briggs, Zhao, Wilson, & Ren, 2008; Wilson, Zhao, Ren, & 
Briggs, 2006; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997).  These data were compiled by the Florida Legislative 
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (2009), situated in the state Department of Financial 
Services, which routinely extracts budgetary figures from annual municipal reports.6 
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 When studying clearance rates, some researchers have suggested it is necessary to control 
for the volume of known offenses as a way of adjusting for agency caseload (Borg & Parker, 
2001; Cloninger & Sartorius, 1979; Davies, 2007; Keel et al., 2009; Litwin, 2004; Litwin & Xu, 
2007; Paré et al., 2007; Xu, 2008).  While results from these studies have not been uniform, the 
present study follows this lead and includes the violent and the property crime rates for control 
purposes. 
 The state legislature created the Commission for Florida Law Enforcement Accreditation 
to facilitate the professionalization of law enforcement organizations.  Accreditation status 
reflects satisfaction of CFA requirements.  The CFA maintains a directory of all currently 
accredited agencies on its website.  Reliance upon multiple listings over time made it possible to 
identify agencies that won accreditation and those departments that remained in compliance with 
the periodic re-accreditation mandates required every three years afterwards. 
 Several variables recorded missing observations.  Many of the CJAP instances were due 
to non-reporting in a particular year.  Some of these oversights were easily reconciled because 
they represented a simple break in an ongoing series of consistent values.  Substitutions were not 
allowed when values were absent in two consecutive years, when the errant data came at the start 
or end of an interval lacking an end-point or anchor value, or when a trend discontinued in the 
immediately following year.  Missing expenditure data were handled by substituting the average 
of the preceding and succeeding years where possible. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 The focus of the present study is upon annual agency clearance rates for violent index 
crimes (homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and robbery) and for property index offenses 
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(burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft).  As discussed earlier, a clearance reflects a 
case that is resolved via arrest or in some other manner.  Municipalities that failed to make a 
report to the UCR Program are eliminated from that year’s analysis.  No interpolations or other 
missing data substitutions are performed on either dependent variable.7 
RESULTS 
 Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for the nominal-level variables.  The proportion 
of CFA-accredited agencies moves from 3% in 1997 to 31% by 2006.  Involvement in 
community policing also displays an appreciable gain over the decade.  Canine units also 
increase in popularity over the years.  The trend is for more and more agencies to demand some 
college study for first-line supervisors.  A one-way analysis of variables (values not shown in the 
table) reveals that entry-level education is the only indicator without a significantly changing 
distribution over the study period. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 Descriptive statistics for the interval-level variables appear in Table 3.  Agency size 
remains relatively constant over the ten-year period and does not produce a significant one-way 
analysis of variance (values not shown in the table).  Post-academy training shows a tendency to 
lengthen over the years.  Law enforcement expenditures climb by 50% during the interval and 
crime rates exhibit a significant decline.  Both violent and property clearance rates remain stable 
steady throughout the series and do not produce a significant one-way analysis of variance.  
However, 7% (n = 181) of the violent clearance rates and 5% (n = 115) of the property clearance 
rates have a zero value. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
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 The zero-order correlation matrix appears in Table 4.  Because the cells are based upon 
large sample sizes, statistically significant relationships are not noted.  Being accredited is linked 
with lower clearance rates.  Similarly, all the police resources are weakly and negatively related 
to clearance rates.  A scan of the matrix indicates multicollinearity is not problematic.  The 
strong relationship between the violent and the property crime rates (r = .73) and clearance rates 
(r = .42) is of little concern because the two index crime categories are estimated independently 
later. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 Distributional graphs (not shown here) further confirm the limited and censored nature of 
the dependent variables.  Normal OLS or pooling estimations would be misspecified.  Table 5 
presents the results of a random-effects tobit analysis.  When accreditation status is the sole 
predictor in the model, it exerts a significant negative effect on violent clearance rates (-3.13) 
and a nonsignificant effect (0.14) on property clearance rates.  The introduction of the remaining 
variables removes the significant effect of accreditation.  The crime rate is positive and 
statistically important for both clearance rates.  Higher rates exert pressure on police 
productivity, lead to greater reporting by the public, and result in more solved crimes.  As 
agencies expand their size, clearance rates decrease.  For example, a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of sworn personnel (nearly 120 people) is associated with a 4.9% 
percentage drop in violent cleared crimes and a 2.6% decrease in the average city's property 
clearance rate.  Unfortunately, since size cannot be split into specific job positions, it is not 
possible to determine whether the impact reflects an enlarged bureaucracy or an inefficient ratio 
of personnel, like few detectives and an excess of field officers.  Property clearance rates are also 
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significantly affected by police expenditure per capita.  Spending $322 more per person on law 
enforcement (a one standard deviation change) is associated with a 2.1% fall in property 
clearance rates.  The result seems counterintuitive, but it is driven by a skewed distribution: 95% 
of agencies clear less than 50% of property crimes.  Overall, the χ2 values reveal that five of the 
six models have at least some predictive power.8  In sum, it does not appear that accreditation 
influences clearance rates when controlling for crime rates, agency size, fiscal capacity, 
investigative readiness, and police-community interactions. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 DISCUSSION 
 
 The results indicate that state-level accreditation does not bolster Florida municipal 
police clearance rates.  In other words, accredited and non-accredited departments produce 
similar violent index and property index clearance rates once we hold constant other 
characteristics, despite claims to the contrary made by accrediting bodies.  Given unique local 
circumstances, it is entirely possible that individual agencies, such as the example of the 
Kingsport (TN) Police Department cited earlier, may occasionally reap a profoundly different 
impact.  However, such experiences are not the norm in Florida.   
A possible alternative is that accreditation is more likely to be sought by agencies that 
can afford to pay for the credential.  As a robustness check, random-effects panel estimations 
(not shown here) were performed while instrumenting accreditation with its own lag and also by 
the municipality’s population size.  The results mirror those listed in Table 5 and post-estimation 
tests indicate significant endogeneity.  When we perform the same regressions with the lag of the 
dependent variable (justified in footnote 8), the endogeneity vanishes and the estimates remain 
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unchanged. Thus, two conclusions emerge.  First, the proxy and instrumental approaches are 
relatively interchangeable.  We prefer the proxy approaches in Table 5 because of the functional 
form of the dependent variable.  Second, accreditation seems to be endogenously driven by 
community size and, when that is controlled, accreditation has no contemporaneous or lagged 
effect on clearance rates.9  This finding can be explained as follows: as municipal population 
increases, agencies have greater manpower and budgets that lead to a higher likelihood of self-
selecting into the accreditation process.  If the sworn size variable could be replaced in future 
work with specific officer types (e.g., patrol, investigations, support, and technical services) or 
budgetary streams for specific law enforcement activities, then those endogenous results might 
be even more compelling. 
 The current study also holds some implications for the clearance literature.  Generally 
speaking, researchers who examine variation in homicide clearance patterns focus either on case 
characteristics or agency resources.  While Wellford and Cronin (1999) have advanced the 
notion that revamped police practices and more appropriate resource allocation are responsible 
for more efficient and productive investigations, other studies have not found similar empirical 
support (Ousey & Lee, 2010; Puckett & Lundman, 2003; Roberts, 2008).  One problem with the 
current study is that the measures might be too global and not sensitive enough to provide a 
critical evaluation.  For example, the community orientated policing indicator used here does not 
reflect how widespread or deeply embedded this philosophy has become in an agency. 
 Although the current results may disappoint proponents, it would be premature to dismiss 
accreditation outright as ineffective.  Because the existing literature is rather sparse and 
rudimentary, it might be productive to sketch out a research agenda that would enable a more 
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empirically grounded view.  As Table 1 demonstrated, accreditation is poised to impact three 
distinct audiences: administrators, agency employees, taxpayers, and other criminal justice 
system entities.  While some researchers have probed executive reactions to accreditation (Carter 
& Sapp, 1994; DuPont, 1993), these early efforts represent an initial step in the effort to gain a 
full and more complete understanding of this activity.  The motivations, expectations, and 
experiences that inform police chiefs’ decisions to seek or refrain from engaging in this effort 
remain unearthed.  Furthermore, nothing is known about how city managers, mayors, or city 
commission/council members influence the decision that an agency should undergo or forego 
such external review.  A second layer of interest are the implications that accreditation has for 
agency personnel.  Only one study compares officer attitudes in accredited agencies against their 
non-recognized counterparts (Gingerich & Russell, 2006).  Furthermore, there are no studies that 
focus on non-sworn employees, let alone the public.  How accreditation affects the intended 
audiences remains an open question at this time. 
While the present study concentrates exclusively on clearance rates, accreditation 
supposedly carries a multitude of ramifications.  Some examples would be claims of more 
affordable insurance premiums, reduced exposure to civil liability, fewer out-of-court 
settlements, a reduction in adverse civil judgments, fewer disgruntled and more empowered 
employees, a smaller number of grievances, more equitable disciplinary actions, and other 
improvements.  To date, all these aspects have gone unstudied.  Legal and financial protections 
are compelling reasons to consider accreditation and they have probably helped inspire the 
industry’s growth. 
Independent audits show that accreditation has grown into a sizeable enterprise.  CALEA 
-20- 
 
assets totaled nearly $6 million at the end of 2008 (CALEA, 2009b, p. 36).  Collections 
(accreditation fees, agency charges, and conference registrations) had doubled in comparison to 
1999 figures, surpassing the $4.5 million mark (CALEA, 2000, p. 12; CALEA, 2009b, p. 37).  
Similarly, employee expenditures (salaries, fringe benefits, payroll taxes, and retirement 
contributions) rose from slightly less than $1 million in 1999 to just under $2 million in 2008 
(CALEA, 2000, pp. 13, 18; CALEA, 2009b, pp. 37, 42).  While financial information is not 
readily available for state groups, there is nothing to suggest they are not similarly profitable. 
 Given these sizable rents, an intriguing question is how has the accreditation movement 
managed to prosper without attracting a corresponding body of research to scrutinize the benefits 
it claims to produce?  Four marketing strategies may have bolstered the accreditation process, 
expanded its reach, and stifled negative publicity.  First, CALEA and some state accreditation 
bodies have diversified their product lines by offering additional programs tailored to public 
safety communications centers and training academies.  Second, along with targeting federal, 
state, and special jurisdiction agencies, CALEA is spreading into new international markets in 
Canada, Latin America, and Mexico.  The third approach is to make the accreditation process 
less daunting.  CALEA sponsors “Police Accreditation Coalitions” (PACs), state networks 
composed of representatives from already accredited law enforcement agencies (CALEA, 2010).  
These support groups maintain web sites, offer training, lend advice to entities navigating the 
accreditation process, hold conferences, and help members become assessors.  Finally, CALEA 
has instituted a scaled-down, intermediate version of accreditation in the hope of spurring 
agencies to pursue full accreditation status. 
 Not to be left out of the picture are the consultants who offer their services to agencies 
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coveting state or national recognition.  Online company descriptions commonly stress their 
employees’ experiences as former high-ranking officers, departmental accreditation managers, or 
past assessors.  It has been suggested elsewhere that ambitious police executives might even 
utilize accreditation status to enhance their personal credentials as they transition within law 
enforcement and political circles (Doerner & Doerner, 2009).  All in all, the accreditation 
movement has become a lucrative endeavor that, until recently, has avoided major inspection. 
A final consideration is that the accreditation industry remains virtually autonomous.  
There is very little governmental oversight.  Ironically, the very same state legislatures that felt a 
compulsion to adopt minimum standards for entry-level personnel during the 1960s still have not 
enacted a corresponding set of minimum expectations for today’s law enforcement agencies.  
Perhaps accreditation does not actually achieve enough marginal gains to merit political support.  
On the other hand, agencies might already follow other industry practices, such as those 
prescribed by the IACP.  Either way, legislative bodies have remained oddly silent about the 
private guidelines being placed on public safety institutions.  To be fair, though, academicians 
have been no more vocal.   
CONCLUSION 
 In light of everything else discussed in this paper, the management of private 
accreditation as a default mechanism for meaningful reform in the public law enforcement sector 
deserves more intensive and critical scrutiny than what has been offered thus far.  A recent work 
finds that accreditation does not facilitate significant organizational improvements (Doerner & 
Doerner, 2009).  This current study extends that effort by showing a lack of any short-term or 
long-run impact on clearance rates.  Future work should continue to establish whether there are 
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real legal, structural, or productivity benefits to the voluntary self-improvement efforts.  For 
now, accreditation at least appears successful at targeting the public coffer.  
ENDNOTES 
1. A total of 487 municipal police departments are listed in the CALEA database as of August 
2010.  Accreditation has already been bestowed upon 385 agencies and 102 others are 
actively undergoing a self-assessment.  All of those agencies have paid a lump-sum fee to 
begin the process.  The CALEA web site lists those initial charges by agency size.  Based on 
their figures, over $5.6 million have been collected.  In addition to the first payment, 
accredited agencies must remain current with annual fees.  Those revenues account for $2 
million.  Once the other agencies complete their self-assessment, they will contribute an 
additional $1.6 million per year. 
2. According to a list on the CALEA web site, at least thirty police accreditation coalitions have 
been created to assist police agencies seeking accreditation. 
3. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) established the National Law 
Enforcement Policy Center in 1987 and tasked it with developing model policies and making 
them available to the law enforcement community.  To date, the Center has produced 117 
model guidelines.  Interested administrators can pick and choose which, if any, IACP 
guidelines they wish to consider.  While one might have the impression that the IACP 
approach and the accreditation procedures are redundant, they do embark on two very 
different directions.  For one thing, while the exact number of applicable accreditation 
standards depends upon agency size and the functions it discharges, there are 463 CALEA 
standards and 275 Florida standards.  A second consideration is the material content.  The 
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IACP model policies are very detailed and contain explicit courses of action.  CFA standards, 
on the other hand, generally refrain from referencing specific behaviors in the field.  Instead, 
they concentrate more heavily on the mechanical aspects of having a policy in place, 
ensuring that each agency member receives a copy, documenting that training has occurred, 
and so forth.  Take, for example, the topic of domestic violence.  The IACP starts with 
dispatch procedures, recommends the deployment of at least two officers, warns against the 
use of emergency lights and sirens when responding, advises officers where to park upon 
arrival, advises officers to separate the feuding parties, and so forth.  In contrast, the CFA 
protocol looks to ensure that the agency policy addresses initial response to the scene, on-
scene investigations, arrest procedures, and so forth.  The exact contents may vary from one 
agency to the next. 
4. The absence of an established canine unit in an agency does not always mean that the agency 
lacks access to such a resource.  Many agencies maintain mutual aid agreements with the 
county sheriff to provide services.   
5. It appears that this item generated some confusion for some respondents.  A handful of 
agencies indicated they had an FTO Program that extended for 52 weeks.  In Florida, though, 
a new police employee is considered to be an at-will employee for the first year.  In other 
words, the employer can dismiss the employee at any point during this period and is not 
obligated to provide a reason for the termination. 
6. An examination of the univariate distribution for this variable uncovered an extreme outlier 
throughout the entire series.  In 2006, Indian Creek Village spent $31,446 per capita for law 
enforcement services.  Indian Creek Village is a small island located in the Miami area.  It 
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contains 14 houses occupied by 38 residents, has one of the highest incomes of any area in 
the United States, and is home to a variety of celebrities.  Ten full-time officers, 4 part-time 
officers, and 4 civilians staff the Indian Creek Village Police Department. 
7. It is possible, especially in smaller jurisdictions, for a clearance rate to exceed 100 percent.  
Borg and Parker (2001, p. 447) attempted to deal with this situation by utilizing a three-year-
moving average to smooth out yearly fluctuations.  This strategy was not amenable to the 
present study because reliance upon a multi-year measure would risk mixing years prior to 
and after accreditation in the same calculation.  Davies (2007, fn. 5) retained values that 
exceeded 100 percent, while Jang et al. (2008, fn. 2) eliminated these cases from the analysis.  
Of the 2,530 violent clearance rates contained in the present study, 35 agencies exceeded a 
value of 100 percent, although 240 were equal to 100 for at least one year.  For property 
clearance rates, only 2 jurisdictions reported property clearance rates greater than 100 percent 
while 26 were equal to 100 for at least one year.  All these observations were kept in the 
analysis. 
8. A referee raised the concern that the random-effects model and its covariates do not control 
for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity.  This is a valid concern.  The estimated results 
could be biased because omitted characteristics of police departments and their surrounding 
communities are lumped into the error term.  From a practical standpoint, it would be 
difficult to capture every pertinent variable for nearly 260 agencies across 10 years.  Fixed-
effects estimation is an option, but the cost is a considerable adjustment to the degrees of 
freedom (from NT-K to NT-N-K) and the introduction of positive serial correlation.  To avoid 
both of those downfalls, another alternative is to lag the dependent variable and use it as a 
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proxy for the unobserved variation (Wooldridge, 2009, pp. 310-312).  This approach allows 
the original variables to capture only contemporaneous effects, like the impact of being 
accredited on clearances in that same year.  Another benefit is that the degrees of freedom are 
relatively preserved (only losing 1 instead of N).  With this model, the estimations are almost 
exactly the same as before; only the crime rates become insignificant. Since the 
interpretations remain unchanged after controlling for agency and community heterogeneity, 
unobserved heterogeneity does not appear to bias the earlier results. 
9. Another referee comment suggested that accreditation might be an executive decision which 
takes time to improve the organizational structure of a police department and achieve 
productivity gains.  To explore that hypothesis, models with one to four lags of the 
accreditation variable are tested for immediate short-run effects as well as a long-run 
propensity that could amass over time.  Neither impact is significant in any lagged model.  
To some extent, this is not surprising.  Agencies begin adopting accreditation policies during 
the “self-assessment” phase, which can last up to 36 months.  By the time the professional 
credential is awarded, structural changes are internalized and should be noticeable. 
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TABLE 1 
Accreditation Benefits Advertised by National and State Law Enforcement Accreditation Bodies  
 
Benefit CALEA AK FL GA IL IN MS NJ NY OK PA SC VA WA 
Increases accountability due to written  
standards/goals, management, training 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
State-of-the-art standards, updated info X  X X X  X X X X X X X  
Effective and efficient service delivery; 
improves performance and evaluation 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
X 
 
X 
Corrects internal deficiencies  X X    X X  X   X  
Prevents and controls crime X  X  X X X X  X   X  
Reduces insurance premiums X      X X   X X  X 
Defends against civil liability lawsuits X X  X   X X X  X X  X 
Improves public trust, confidence, 
support, understanding 
 
X 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Promotes community policing, quality 
of life 
 
X 
  
X 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
   
X 
  
X 
 
Increases cooperation with other 
criminal justice system members 
   
X 
   
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
   
X 
 
Improves employee morale   X    X X X X X X X X 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics, Nominal-Level Variables 
 
Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Accredited: 
   1 = Yes 
   n 
 
 
  3% 
256 
 
  5% 
257 
 
  9% 
255 
 
14% 
255 
 
15%
255 
 
20% 
255 
 
23% 
255 
 
26% 
255 
 
30% 
255 
 
31% 
256 
COP: 
   1 = Yes 
   n 
 
 
80% 
251 
 
78% 
253 
 
71% 
254 
 
77% 
251 
 
61% 
251 
 
57% 
253 
 
49% 
251 
 
50% 
252 
 
53% 
251 
 
51% 
254 
Canine Unit: 
   1 = Yes 
   n 
 
 
43% 
256 
 
45% 
257 
 
44% 
255 
 
53% 
255 
 
50% 
255 
 
48% 
255 
 
54% 
254 
 
55% 
253 
 
56% 
253 
 
57% 
255 
Entry Education: 
   1 = Some College 
   n 
 
 
 
  8% 
256 
 
 
11% 
257 
 
 
 
12% 
255 
 
 
12% 
255 
 
 
11% 
255 
 
 
10% 
253 
 
 
13% 
254 
 
 
13% 
255 
 
 
10% 
255 
 
 
10% 
256 
Promote Education: 
   1 = Some College 
   n 
 
 
14% 
256 
 
14% 
257 
 
15% 
255 
 
31% 
255 
 
28% 
255 
 
29% 
252 
 
33% 
251 
 
32% 
250 
 
31% 
252 
 
31% 
254 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics, Interval-Level Variables 
 
Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Violent Cleared: 
    Mean 
    S.D. 
    n 
 
55.62 
27.62 
254 
 
56.32 
26.73 
256 
 
57.89 
27.62 
253 
 
55.81 
29.38 
254 
 
57.78 
27.17 
254 
 
58.38 
25.78 
251 
 
58.46 
26.26 
251 
 
57.87 
26.32 
251 
 
57.20 
28.01 
253 
 
58.34 
28.64 
253 
% Property Cleared: 
    Mean 
    S.D. 
    n 
 
22.42 
16.77 
254 
 
21.26 
14.66 
256 
 
22.22 
17.00 
253 
 
20.49 
17.18 
254 
 
22.15 
16.13 
254 
 
22.33 
14.73 
251 
 
23.15 
15.75 
251 
 
22.60 
16.16 
251 
 
22.37 
15.78 
253 
 
23.15 
20.96 
253 
Violent Crime Rate: 
    Mean 
    S.D. 
    n 
 
87.15 
87.38 
254 
 
83.52 
81.59 
256 
 
74.93 
70.82 
253 
 
72.15 
72.24 
254 
 
76.09 
74.95 
254 
 
75.31 
71.74 
251 
 
70.02 
65.38 
251 
 
71.14 
80.41 
251 
 
67.48 
64.17 
253 
 
68.75 
61.62 
253 
Property Crime Rate: 
    Mean 
    S.D. 
    n 
 
618.57 
507.69 
254 
 
619.37 
452.43 
256 
 
548.51 
417.99 
253 
 
499.58 
410.02 
254 
 
512.45 
372.83 
254 
 
509.16 
344.30 
251 
 
492.73 
310.14 
251 
 
471.47 
460.29 
251 
 
437.85 
275.28 
253 
 
418.25 
272.66 
253 
# Sworn 
    Mean 
    S.D. 
    n 
 
56.88 
113.01 
256 
 
58.63 
115.04 
257 
 
59.79 
117.90 
255 
 
60.96 
118.60 
255 
 
61.36 
119.45 
255 
 
61.82 
119.62 
255 
 
63.18 
119.55 
255 
 
63.57 
118.40 
255 
 
64.48 
120.48 
255 
 
65.91 
122.36 
256 
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LE Expenditure per capita: 
    Mean 
    S.D. 
    n 
 
249.46 
259.38 
252 
 
  260.33 
281.03 
255 
 
277.30 
305.01 
253 
 
  284.70 
290.23 
254 
 
294.50 
303.92 
253 
 
306.06 
311.27 
254 
 
317.44 
315.25 
254 
 
338.17 
340.10 
253 
 
 352.54 
354.23 
251 
 
  378.07 
406.28 
253 
FTO Weeks: 
    Mean 
    S.D. 
    n 
 
    9.82 
5.31 
245 
 
    9.80 
5.20 
252 
 
10.58 
4.94 
255 
 
10.97 
4.74 
254 
 
11.60 
 4.15 
252 
 
11.81 
5.04 
251 
 
12.10 
4.45 
253 
 
12.02 
4.46 
252 
 
10.80 
5.54 
252 
 
12.16 
    4.30 
252 
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TABLE 4 
Zero-Order Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 Y1 Y2 
X1 Accredited 1.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.24 0.02 0.18 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.21 -0.09 -0.06 
X2 Violent Crime Rate  1.00 0.73 0.23 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.03 
X3 Property Crime Rate   1.00 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.09 -0.03 
X4 # Sworn    1.00 0.00 0.26 0.37 0.27 0.29 0.21 -0.16 -0.14 
X5 LE Expenditure     1.00 -0.06 -0.12 -0.06 0.11 0.09 -0.14 -0.15 
X6 COP      1.00 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.08 -0.08 -0.10 
X7 Canine Unit       1.00 0.33 0.16 0.19 -0.10 -0.01 
X8 FTO Weeks        1.00 0.14 0.19 -0.10 -0.12 
X9 Entry Education         1.00 0.42 -0.07 -0.08 
X10 Promote Education          1.00 -0.02 -0.02 
Y1 % Violent Cleared           1.00 0.42 
Y2 % Property Cleared            1.00 
 
Note: Because of the large sample size, a correlation of .04 is significant at the .05 level. 
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TABLE 5 
Random-Effects Tobit Panel Data Analysis with Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
 
 % Violent Cleared % Property Cleared 
Variable Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Accredited -3.13* 1.45 -1.13   1.77 -0.82   1.43  0.14 0.68   1.18* 0.66  0.86 0.82 
Violent Crime Rate — —    0.04* 0.02    0.04* 0.02 — — — — — — 
Property Crime Rate — — — — — — — —   0.00* 0.00   0.00* 0.00 
# Sworn — —   -0.04* 0.01   -0.04* 0.01 — — -0.02* 0.01   -0.02* 0.01 
Expenditure — — -0.01   0.01 -0.01   0.01 — — -0.01* 0.00   -0.01* 0.00 
COP — — — —  -0.74   1.67 — — — — -0.63   0.81 
Canine Unit — — — — -0.36   1.73 — — — —  1.50  0.94 
FTO Weeks — — — — -0.21   0.17 — — — —   0.01 0.10 
Entry Education — — — —   2.07  2.33 — — — — -0.31  1.52 
Promote Education — — — —   0.05  1.18 — — — —   0.57 0.86 
Constant 58.26* 1.48  61.13* 2.88  63.96* 3.84 21.87* 0.71  23.27* 1.29  22.87* 1.72 
 
# Observations 
 
2,530 
 
2,508 
 
2,439 
 
2,530 
 
2,508 
 
2,439 
# Agencies 257 257 257 257 257 257 
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Log-Likelihood -10,380 -10,272 -9,999 -9,72 -9,701 -9,419 
χ2 4.64* 31.60* 31.64* 0.04 20.24* 23.78* 
 
Note: The lower and upper censoring thresholds are 0 and 100, respectively.  The log-likelihood function is maximized using a Gauss-
Hermite quadrature with twelve integration points (see Olsen and Shafer, 2001).  Standard errors are bootstrapped by 50 random 
draws from the sample.  The * indicates significance at the .05 level.
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